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The South Pacific
Benjamin Reilly and Elsina Wainwright
The South Pacific is, at first glance, an unlikely setting for a chapter on
state failure. The region is home to a dozen states and a similar number
of related territories, all but one of which have a population of fewer than
1 million, and several of them have fewer than 20,000. Most of the region
comprises small island states interspersed with vast stretches of ocean
waters and isolated from the world’s power centres. With one exception,
there are no land borders. Most of the island states are small in terms of
population and land area, but they lay claim to vast maritime resources.
In recent years, however, perceptions of the South Pacific have
changed – from an underperforming but basically benign region, to one
that is now characterized as an ‘‘arc of instability’’, comprising ‘‘weak’’
and ‘‘failing’’ states. Armed conflicts in Papua New Guinea’s eastern is-
land of Bougainville and the neighbouring Solomon Islands have claimed
thousands of lives over the past decade. Regional governments – led by
Australia, the dominant metropolitan power in the South Pacific – have
headed peacemaking interventions into both countries in recent years,
with a considerable degree of success. Despite this, the region receives
very little attention in the rest of the world and virtually no international
media coverage. This chapter therefore begins by introducing the basic
facts about the South Pacific, before moving on to a discussion of state
failure and recent interventions in the region.
The Pacific Islands are usually thought to comprise three sub-regions –
Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia – which reflect both cultural and
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colonial differences. In the western Pacific, all of New Guinea and its asso-
ciated islands are part of Melanesia, which contains the overwhelming
majority of the region’s population and land area. Papua New Guinea
is the largest country in Melanesia, and has a population of 5.7 million
people – making it larger than all the other Pacific Islands combined.
Papua New Guinea and the other Melanesian states of Fiji (800,000),
the Solomon Islands (520,000) and Vanuatu (200,000) account for over
90 per cent of the population of the entire South Pacific region.
The cultural boundaries of Melanesia also spread further west, into the
Indonesian province of West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), the majority of
whose people are culturally kin to those in Papua New Guinea rather
than to the rest of Indonesia. The border between the two takes the
form of a straight line down the middle of the island of New Guinea – a
line that also serves as a bizarre division in international politics between
‘‘Asia’’ and ‘‘the Pacific’’, separating language groups, tribes and some-
times even villages between the two world regions.
Further east, Polynesia contains some of the region’s smallest countries
– including the world’s tiniest fully independent state, Tuvalu, which has
a population of just 10,000. The two largest states in the region are Sa-
moa (population 170,000) and Tonga (100,000). In part by virtue of their
homogeneous populations and hierarchical traditional social structures,
these countries have exhibited more stable government than the Melane-
sian countries – although this has come at the cost of also having a more
limited form of democracy, with political office restricted to members of
the traditional aristocracy. New Zealand has traditionally played a major
role in Polynesian affairs, and two of the smallest Polynesian micro-
states, the Cook Islands (15,000) and Niue (1,500), retain constitutional
links with New Zealand as freely associated states.
Finally, in the Central Pacific, Micronesia’s links are mainly with the
United States. Three independent states – the Republic of Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau – remain freely
associated with the United States under a ‘‘compact relationship’’ that
gives the United States extensive military concessions in return for gener-
ous economic assistance. There are two other independent Micronesian
states: Kiribati (one of the Pacific’s poorest states) and Nauru (an island
formerly administered by Australia that once boasted one of the world’s
highest per capita GDPs owing to its now exhausted phosphate reserves).
The Pacific also includes the French territories of New Caledonia,
Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia; and the American dependen-
cies of American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Other
powers have also played a colonial role in the Pacific: before being taken
over by the United States at the end of the Second World War, much of
Micronesia was held by Japan under a League of Nations mandate; simi-
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larly, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom assumed man-
date responsibilities originally held by Germany in New Guinea, Samoa
and Nauru.
The arc of instability
For most of the past 20 years the South Pacific region has been distinctive
not for its failures but for its successes in building apparently stable and
democratic post-colonial states. On many comparative rankings of gov-
ernment performance, the South Pacific has ranked amongst the most
democratic regions in the world.1 For example, the US private founda-
tion Freedom House, which publishes a detailed annual ranking of polit-
ical and civil rights for every country, has routinely placed the entire
South Pacific region in the ‘‘free’’ category.2 Especially in the larger and
more populous Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Is-
lands, Vanuatu and, intermittently, Fiji, freely contested and highly com-
petitive national and local elections have occurred regularly.3
Despite this, over the past few years the perception of the South Pacific
has changed from an ‘‘oasis of democracy’’ to an ‘‘arc of instability’’.4
Melanesia in particular has been plagued by violent internal conflict, pre-
cipitating an ‘‘Africanization’’ of politics in which democratically elected
governments have been deposed through ethnic conflicts.5 One of the re-
gion’s most developed states, Fiji, experienced military coups in 1987 and
2000 – both times following the election of governments perceived to be
too close to the country’s Indo-Fijian community. Papua New Guinea has
faced a decade of civil war on its eastern island of Bougainville, which
has made claims of affinity with the neighbouring Solomon Islands. In ad-
dition, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji have all suffered army mu-
tinies in recent years.
The most dramatic case of state decline in the region is the Solomon
Islands. In June 2000 the elected government of the Solomon Islands,
one of the Pacific’s poorest states, was overthrown after rebels, aided by
elements of the police force, seized the capital and forced the resignation
of the incumbent prime minister. A peace deal negotiated in the Austra-
lian city of Townsville resulted in the distribution of some compensation
payments and the holding of elections in December 2001, which saw
a new government installed. The country remained in deep difficulty,
however, unable to pay public officials such as nurses and teachers or to
provide basic government services. Until the Australian-led Regional As-
sistance Mission to the Solomon Islands commenced in July 2003 (de-
scribed below), the Solomons was the country most often mentioned in
discussions of state failure in the Pacific. The Australian Strategic Policy
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Institute called it a ‘‘failing state’’,6 a term also used by the Australian
government, while The Economist said that it ‘‘faces the prospect of be-
coming the Pacific’s first failed state’’.7
Elsewhere, the tiny island of Nauru (population 11,000) is also
approaching ‘‘failed state’’ status, but for very different reasons. Like
the Solomon Islands, Nauru is now essentially bankrupt, dependent on
laundering money, selling passports and receipts of external aid from
Australia (in return for temporarily accepting several hundred unwanted
Australian refugee claimants) and China (to which it recently switched
allegiance from Taiwan) in order to survive. However, Nauru’s trajectory
towards a failed state is quite different from that of the Solomon Islands,
since it has lost, squandered or spent almost all of a once vast trust fund
set up to manage revenues from its now exhausted phosphate resources.
As one commentator has noted, ‘‘One state has failed because of its pov-
erty, the other because of its inability to handle riches.’’8
The establishment of international shelf banks, shipping flags of conve-
nience and passport sales has also brought the Pacific Islands into contact
with a range of shady organizations, including terrorist groups. In early
2003, three vessels flying the Tongan flag were caught in the Mediterra-
nean moving weapons, explosives and men for al Qaeda. In April 2003,
US authorities reported that six alleged terrorists, including two alleged
al Qaeda operatives, had been arrested in South East Asia carrying
Nauruan passports. In 2003, Nauru promised to end its shelf banks
and passport sales (which some other Pacific states also use as means of
revenue-raising) after the United States proscribed such activities as part
of its war on terrorism. It remains to be seen how Nauru will be kept sol-
vent into the future without them.
Indicators of state failure
There is significant variation in the experience of South Pacific countries
in building viable states. On the one hand, countries such as Samoa have
been relatively successful post-colonial states, providing steady if unspec-
tacular economic growth and stability of government, notwithstanding an
ongoing dependence on foreign aid. On the other hand, the Solomon Is-
lands displayed many of the hallmarks of a failing state.
A range of factors contribute to state failure in the region. The colonial
legacy left a range of weak and sometimes artificial newly independent
countries, some of them barely able to assume even the basic responsibil-
ities of statehood. As a result, poor governance has been a major prob-
lem, along with weakened respect for the rule of law and central author-
ity. Over the past decade, corruption has become widespread. Other
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causes of tension include growing economic inequalities, changing social
relations and the challenges to traditional lifestyles and authorities posed
by the inexorable forces of modernization and urbanization. Taken to-
gether, these factors indicate a growing weakness of state capacity and
an increasing likelihood of further troubles in the region in the future.
Many of these factors are common to other ‘‘weak state’’ or ‘‘failing
state’’ scenarios. What distinguishes the South Pacific is the concentra-
tion of these factors in some of the most ethno-linguistically diverse soci-
eties to be found anywhere in the world, creating particular problems of
unstable executive government, rent-seeking politics and ethnic conflict.
These problems are concentrated in Melanesia, the Pacific’s most popu-
lous, diverse and impoverished region. Particular phenomena include
the increasingly violent manipulation of ethnic identities, disputes over
land and natural resources, tensions in civil–military relations, the prolif-
eration of small arms, law and order problems, and deep structural weak-
nesses of governance. Each of these issues will now be dealt with briefly.
Ethnic divisions
The South Pacific is exceptionally diverse. More languages are spoken
in Papua New Guinea alone than in all of Africa. Across Melanesia,
over 1,200 indigenous languages (about one-quarter of the world’s
languages) are spoken by a mere 10 million people, making it easily
the most fragmented region in the world in ethno-linguistic terms. Even
this figure understates the real level of ethno-political diversity: most lin-
guistic groups are themselves fragmented into dozens of unilateral de-
scent groups known as clans. Regional differences (for example, between
coastal dwellers and highlanders in Papua New Guinea, or between east
and west coasts in Fiji) are also important, as are tensions between
‘‘indigenous’’ and ‘‘settler’’ communities (such as between indigenous ka-
naks and French-settler caldoches in New Caledonia), between different
island groups (for example, Malaita versus Guadalcanal in the Solomon
Islands), between traditional chiefs and commoners (especially in Polyne-
sia), and ultimately between cultures (for example, ethnic Fijians versus
Indo-Fijians in Fiji).
Ethnic divisions are not necessarily negative. One reason that has been
advanced for Papua New Guinea’s unusual longevity as a democracy is
that there are so many groups that none can dominate and thus some
kind of power-sharing at the political level is unavoidable.9 But ethnicity
is a fluid phenomenon, and there have been several cases of fragmented
social structures being transformed into bipolar, us-versus-them constel-
lations as part of the conflict spiral. This was the case in the long-running
Bougainville war and again more recently in the Solomon Islands, where
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ethnic tensions between different island populations have been exploited
in order to challenge the legitimacy of the state itself.
Often ethnicity is used as a way of mobilizing support to achieve eco-
nomic gains. The centrality of exploitable resources to many apparently
‘‘ethnic’’ conflicts has been an underlying factor driving a number of
South Pacific conflicts, most of which are, in reality, power struggles over
control of resources and control of the state rather than outbreaks of an-
cient hatreds. The most obvious manifestation of this resource-driven
pattern of conflict is the lucrative tropical timber industry, the exploita-
tion of which has played an important role in contributing to corruption,
distortion of the market-place and the resort to violence in countries such
as Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. In Fiji, where the
bicultural ethnic cleavage is most stark, the 2000 coup appears to have
been as much about access to mahogany leases and a redistribution of
forces within the indigenous Fijian community as it was an attack upon
Indo-Fijians.
Land disputes
Across the region, the most precious resource of all is land itself. Land
ownership, land redistribution, land reform and land exploitation have
been major factors underlying much supposedly ethnic or political con-
flict. Two main types of conflict over land appear to be at work in the
region. In the first type, tensions between indigenous populations and
settler groups, each with different approaches to land ownership and ex-
ploitation, act as a combustible formula to mobilize deep (but often la-
tent) perceptions of ethnic difference. This has been a recurring pattern
in countries with an identifiable indigenous–settler cleavage, such as Fiji
and New Caledonia, where disputes over land ownership have been
deepened by differences in the skills and livelihoods of the particular eth-
nic groups. But the second type of conflict is likely to become more com-
mon in the future. This is a conflict between established local populations
and in-migrants from adjacent islands, as in the Solomon Islands between
migrants from Malaita residing on the island of Guadalcanal. In this and
a number of other conflicts over land in the region, tensions between tra-
ditional forms of title and ownership of private property are increasingly
prevalent. In both cases, however, access to land and the perception of
group inequality have been readily exploited by ethnic leaders as a po-
tent mobilizing force.
Civil–military relations
Unpredictability in terms of civil–military relations in the region has also
been a factor, at least since the first Fijian coups in 1987 carried out
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by Sitiveni Rabuka and a team of Fijian army officers. Ten years later, in
March 1997, came the so-called Sandline affair in Papua New Guinea,
when the Papua New Guinea Defence Force refused to accept govern-
ment attempts to hire a force of largely South African mercenaries
for the ongoing secessionist war on Bougainville. The revolt stopped
well short of a full-scale attempted coup, but nonetheless forced Prime
Minister Julius Chan to stand aside in the lead-up to the 1997 elections,
in which he and most of his cabinet lost their seats. The 2000 coup in Fiji
led by George Speight was also carried out with the assistance of ele-
ments of the Fijian military, particularly the Special Forces, and the after-
math of the coup saw several officers court-marshalled after a bloody
shoot-out between different units of the military as traditional power
holders re-established control.
Less dramatically, the defence forces of both Vanuatu and Papua New
Guinea have been involved in recent years in mutinous industrial pro-
tests against government plans for pay-cuts and staff reductions. In both
cases, the rebellious units were persuaded to return to barracks after a
period of negotiation with the government. The fact that such insurrec-
tions occurred at all, however, led governments in both countries to shy
away from further attempts at reform, choosing instead to maintain an
oversized and underperforming military force. A further problem is that
the kinds of security issues countries such as Vanuatu or the Solomon Is-
lands face are internal or transnational, and more suited to a police than
a military response. However, indigenous police forces have been poorly
equipped to meet these challenges.
Small arms proliferation
Until recently, the South Pacific’s geographical isolation helped protect
it from the abundant supply of cheap light weapons that have fuelled
conflicts in other regions.10 There is documented evidence, however, of
guns being passed from the mainland of Papua New Guinea, through
Bougainville, and down to combatants in the Solomon Islands. And small
arms and the glamorization of military culture have also spread into
other parts of Papua New Guinea – the Southern Highlands province, to
give but one example, is plagued by violence.
There are other ways in which guns can be placed in the hands of rebel
forces, as was shown by the Fiji coup in May 2000. Utilizing arms stolen
from military depots, George Speight and his supporters – including
members of the Fijian army’s Special Forces Unit – amassed an extra-
ordinary armoury of firepower, taking the government hostage. Two
weeks later, in the Solomon Islands, Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulu-
fa’alu was forced to resign at gunpoint after armed rebels from the
Malaita Eagle Force seized the capital. In the Solomon Islands it was
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the police force (whose members are overwhelmingly Malaitan) that sup-
plied the weapons. In each case, the key has been access to weapons,
mostly stolen from military or police armouries.
Law and order
Law and order is one of the most serious problems facing states such as
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Weak governance, a plen-
tiful supply of weapons, the glorification of gun culture and few employ-
ment prospects have contributed to an environment of violence.11 In the
Solomon Islands prior to the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission,
for example, the 1998–2000 ethnic conflict shaded into ongoing violence,
lawlessness and intimidation.12 There was a broad pattern of criminality
and impunity, as serious crimes such as murder went unpunished. Ex-
militants and criminal gangs were involved in extortion and related activ-
ities, and regularly intimidated and threatened politicians and public offi-
cials.
The Solomon Islands police were themselves a major part of the law
and order crisis. Some members of the police force had connections with
criminal gangs and ex-militias; most of the rest were powerless to enforce
law and order.13 Those members of the force who were involved in the
ethnic conflict on the Malaitan side were allowed back into the police
under the Townsville Peace Agreement. Many ex-militants were also ap-
pointed as special constables, a move that exacerbated the law and order
crisis.
Weak governance
One indicator of state failure is a steady collapse of basic services such
as health, education and transport infrastructure. Since governments in
some South Pacific countries are nearly bankrupt, there has been insuffi-
cient government money to pay healthcare workers or teachers. A youth
bulge, poor education and few employment prospects are a dangerous
mix: young men look up to those with guns rather than to teachers or
other positive role models. In the Solomon Islands, for example, a violent
internal ethno-political conflict, amounting to civil war, saw the economy
deteriorate sharply: foreign investment plummeted, exports collapsed
and the government was bankrupt. The country’s GDP had halved since
independence. Education was particularly difficult in such conditions, and
many primary and secondary schools in the Solomon Islands remained
closed for most of 2002.
Governance problems affect different parts of the Pacific in different
ways. In Melanesia, problems of governance are endemic and stem in
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part from the nature of democratic politics. There is an odd mingling of
traditional tribal culture with Westminster-style institutions.14 Political
parties are not based around cleavages of class or ideology, and most
candidates are not aligned with any party but stand as independents. As
a result, executive government tends to be unstable, because without
strong parties it is difficult to avoid shifts in support within parliament.
No-confidence votes and unstable governments have been ongoing prob-
lems in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Most
members of parliament lose their seats at each election, meaning there
are relatively few politicians who last more than two or three terms.
And there are almost no women in parliament. Significantly, in the few
cases where there has been a meaningful party system – in Fiji or in
Vanuatu, for example – party structures have been formed primarily
around identity-based factors, such as the Indian–Fijian split in Fiji or
the anglophone–francophone division in Vanuatu. Recently, Papua New
Guinea passed an ambitious constitutional reform aimed at building a
more coherent and stable political system, although it remains to be
seen whether this initiative will have the desired results.15
The question of viability
Is there a minimum size of population, economy or territory, or a mini-
mum degree of effectiveness of government, for a successful state? These
are questions that should perhaps be asked of the states in the South Pa-
cific. Certainly, there are cases in the region in which the gap between ju-
ridical sovereignty and effective statehood is yawningly wide.
Prior to independence there were several proposals to group the states
of the South-West Pacific into a Melanesian federation, and similar plans
were raised in other parts of the Pacific. But, with one or two exceptions
(the Federated States of Micronesia, which was formed by the amalgam-
ation of Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei and Kosrae in 1986, being the main ex-
ample), such proposals were never seriously pursued. Indeed, the recent
trend in the Pacific has been for even greater fragmentation: Tuvalu was
created by its separation from the Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati) in 1978;
Bougainville has attempted to secede from Papua New Guinea; and there
are persistent ‘‘breakaway’’ movements in other countries, such as the
Western Provinces of the Solomon Islands. However, there has recently
been a renewed push for the sharing of regional resources. Australia and
New Zealand have led this push, and it has received a considerable de-
gree of acceptance throughout the region.
There is a question about the long-term viability of some Pacific Island
states, particularly given the effect that global warming and rising sea
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levels may have on several low-lying atoll states, and other problems such
as small populations, lack of employment opportunities, distance from
potential markets, unsustainable population growth, the colonial legacy
and the difficult overlay of sovereign statehood on to traditional societies
that do not cohere with borders. However, it is notable that small size
does not appear to be a determinant of state failure. The relative success
of the Pacific’s (and the world’s) smallest state, Tuvalu, has been hailed
as proof that ‘‘small is viable’’, whereas the region’s most intractable
problems have occurred in the larger Melanesian states such as Papua
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.16
Part of the problem in these countries is the very ‘‘statelessness’’ of tra-
ditional societies. In contrast to the homogeneous and hierarchical Poly-
nesian kingdoms, most of which had well-established statelike forms of
social organization prior to European contact, most of Melanesia was
essentially stateless, composed of thousands of small acephalous social
groups. As a consequence, countries such as the Solomon Islands inher-
ited colonial institutions of statehood that have not properly taken root.17
The increasing glorification of gun culture in parts of the Solomons and
Papua New Guinea is a good demonstration of the vexed question of
how modern statehood relates to the pre-existing society. In Papua
New Guinea, conflict is part of the traditional social order, and commu-
nities had highly ritualized tribal wars. The now-plentiful supply of semi-
automatic weaponry, however, has changed the nature of the conflict and
made it far more destructive.
International intervention
For most of the world, the Pacific Islands are obscure and unimportant.
Conflicts in the region attract little if any international media coverage
and have minimal strategic importance for any Western country beyond
Australia and New Zealand. This has serious implications for potential
international intervention in intra-state conflicts, which are inevitably
based on a combination of media coverage and a sober calculation of
strategic interest. However, two conflicts in the region, in Bougainville
and the Solomon Islands, have recently been the target of international
interventions to restore peace.
Bougainville
The most serious security issue in the Pacific Island region in the 1990s
centred around the demand by rebel groups for Bougainville’s indepen-
dence, a demand opposed not only by Papua New Guinea but also by
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many Bougainvilleans. Before the conflict began, Bougainville’s substan-
tial contribution to Papua New Guinea’s national economy was dispro-
portionate to its small size and population, mainly owing to the enormous
open-cut copper, gold and silver mine at Panguna in the central moun-
tains of the main island, which operated from 1972 until the conflict
caused its closure in 1989.
A series of increasingly violent clashes between government forces and
the various pro- and anti-independence militias came to a head in 1997,
when the Papua New Guinea government commissioned an international
mercenary service, Executive Outcomes, to attack the rebels. In a sur-
prise move, the Papua New Guinean army’s chief commander announced
the refusal of his forces to work with the mercenaries, who were ejected
from the country. Prime Minister Julius Chan and two key ministers in-
volved in engaging the mercenaries were forced to stand down. These
events helped create conditions conducive to the remarkable progress to-
wards conflict resolution that occurred in the latter part of 1997. Taking
advantage of that changed position at the national level, rebel forces be-
gan to make direct contact with the central government. Further develop-
ments resulted in the New Zealand government facilitating talks between
the Bougainvillean leaders. These talks resulted in a cease-fire agree-
ment, followed by the deployment on the island of an unarmed Peace
Monitoring Group, led by Australia, accompanied by a UN observer
team.
Since then, successive agreements – notably the ‘‘Loloata Understand-
ing’’ of March 2000 and the Bougainville Peace Agreement signed at
Arawa in August 2001 – have helped sustain peace and have paved the
way for a self-determination referendum on Bougainville’s political status
to be held at some unspecified time in the future, after an extended
period of autonomy from the central government. Whether a referendum
can actually be conducted in Bougainville, and whether the various dis-
putants will accept the result, remain to be seen. However, the commit-
ment to hold and recognize the results of the referendum has been af-
firmed by Australia, which previously opposed any such step that could
lead to independence.
The Solomon Islands
The slide into civil war in the Solomon Islands, which had been a func-
tioning democracy since its emergence as an independent state in 1978,
is a good example of the shifting international interest in conflicts in the
South Pacific. When ethnic tension began to escalate in 1998 between
residents of Guadalcanal and settlers from the adjacent island of Malaita,
the country moved rapidly from a state of ethnic tension to a virtual civil
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war. In June 2000, Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was taken hos-
tage by Malaitan rebels, who demanded, and received, his resignation.
With the capital under the control of a militia force and a democratically
elected government deposed by force, the immediate response from the
Solomon Islands government, or what was left of it, was to ask for exter-
nal military assistance to restore peace.
These requests were ignored, both by regional powers such as Austra-
lia and New Zealand, but also by the United Nations. Despite the pleas
of the Solomon Islands representative in New York, neither the General
Assembly nor the Security Council would discuss the crisis – primarily
because there was no state willing to raise and sponsor such a discussion.
To do so would inevitably have led to the expectation that, if any exter-
nal assistance were authorized, then Australia and New Zealand – the
only developed countries with strategic interests in the islands – would
be responsible for any intervention. The governments of both countries
had already made it clear that this was not something they were prepared
to countenance. So there the matter lapsed, along with the elected gov-
ernment of the Solomon Islands.
However, in October 2000 the Australian and New Zealand govern-
ments, with support from the Commonwealth Secretariat, did facilitate a
peace process, the Townsville Peace Agreement, which provided a tem-
porary end to hostilities via an unarmed International Peace Monitoring
Group composed of officials from Australia and New Zealand and from
the police forces of Pacific Islands nations, including Vanuatu, the Cook
Islands and Tonga. But the peace deal did not address the underlying is-
sues that had fuelled the conflict, and problems in the Solomons contin-
ued to multiply.
In June 2003, in a major policy shift, the Australian government an-
nounced its intention to lead a multinational police and military opera-
tion into the Solomon Islands in an effort to revive the failing state: over
2,000 personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji,
Tonga and other states in the region were deployed in the Regional As-
sistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, Operation Helpem Fren (‘‘help-
ing a friend’’ in Pidgin). A civilian Special Coordinator of the mission was
also appointed. For its part, Australia deployed 1,500 Australian Defence
Force personnel, along with over 200 members of the Australian Federal
Police. The first phase of this mission involved the restoration of law and
order and the puncturing of the climate of lawlessness and impunity. The
deployed police worked alongside members of the Royal Solomon
Islands Police – itself in need of substantial reconfiguration – to remove
guns from the gangs and ex-militia members and to protect key political
figures from intimidation.
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Although primarily a policing operation, the mission was initially sup-
ported by a sizeable military deployment. This military contingent pro-
vided the police with logistical support and protection if required. By
the end of 2003, law and order had been significantly restored in the ma-
jor urban areas, and the bulk of the military contingent withdrew.
The second phase of the assistance mission involves broader state-
building. A number of civilian officials have been deployed to the Solo-
mon Islands as part of a package of economic, law and justice, and finan-
cial assistance. The purpose of this package is to help Solomon Islanders
build effective political and security institutions, address their economic
and social problems, revive the economy and ensure that government
services are again delivered to citizens.18 The deployed police are help-
ing to conduct criminal investigations and to rebuild the Royal Solomon
Islands Police. They will remain on the ground for a number of years.
This phase is a long-term commitment, which may last up to 10 years.
The Australian-led Solomon Islands rescue plan received broad sup-
port from the region and the endorsement of the Pacific Islands Forum,
the multilateral regional organization. Pacific Islands Forum foreign min-
isters placed the mission within the framework of the Forum’s Biketawa
Declaration, which provided for a collective response to security threats –
this was the first time this declaration had been activated.19 Neighbour-
ing countries in the South Pacific acknowledged that the Solomon Islands
crisis risked destabilizing the rest of the region. Both the UN Secretary-
General and the UN Security Council also issued statements after the
commencement of the mission welcoming the operation and its regional
nature.20
The plan also received the support of the Solomon Islands parliament.
Indeed, requests from the Solomon Islands Governor General and the
prime minister, together with parliament’s support and overwhelming
popular support, were key factors in this policy shift towards what the
Australian government has described as ‘‘cooperative intervention’’.21
The Solomon Islands’ consent to this intrusion on its sovereignty helped
to allay regional concerns.
Although the assistance mission has been proceeding well, many chal-
lenges still lie ahead. Rebuilding the Solomon Islands’ institutions and
targeting corruption are long-term and complex endeavours and Solo-
mon Islanders expect continuing improvement. The mission has been
based on a minimal derogation of the sovereignty of the Solomon Is-
lands. It is therefore vulnerable to changing political alignments within
the parliament. Furthermore, the mission faces the continuing challenge
of working in partnership with Solomon Islanders to build up Solomon
Islanders’ skills, and not to erode them.
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Australia’s new policy in the South Pacific
Australia’s intervention in the Solomon Islands represented a dramatic
shift in Australia’s policy approach towards the South Pacific. This policy
shift stemmed in part from the increasing recognition that Australia’s na-
tional interests were engaged by the deterioration of some of the states in
its neighbourhood.
In general, states determine their level of engagement with a region
on the basis of a stark calculation of their national interests. So what
are Australia’s interests in the South Pacific? As the regional metropole,
Australia’s interests in the South Pacific arise primarily from geography:
the region is on Australia’s doorstep, in an arc to its north-east. Australia
therefore has enduring strategic interests in the South Pacific. As Aus-
tralia’s Defence 2000 White Paper makes clear, Australia has a stake in
ensuring that the states in its immediate neighbourhood are stable and
secure, and not beset by territorial uncertainty or threatened by ‘‘major
internal challenges’’.22 Australia also has an interest in preventing ‘‘the
positioning in neighbouring states of foreign forces that might be used to
attack Australia’’.23
The 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, and
the bombing in Bali on 12 October 2002 – which killed 202 people, 88 of
them Australian – also had an impact on Australia’s calculation. Policy
makers in Australia had a heightened awareness of the security implica-
tions of state failure in the region.
Another concern was the potential for transnational crime in the South
Pacific. A number of South Pacific states are fast approaching bank-
ruptcy. This makes them vulnerable to influence by both state and non-
state actors that might seek to provide money for all sorts of purposes,
including the sale of sovereignty.24 Nauru, Tonga, Samoa and other is-
land states have sold thousands of passports to foreign citizens. Vanuatu
has sold shipping flags and, like Nauru, has been a centre of money laun-
dering owing to its weak banking regulations. And the Solomon Islands
government has considered receiving aid funding from Taiwan in return
for using one of its outer islands as a toxic waste dump, amid other poten-
tial sales of its sovereignty.25
When states institutions are weak, the shadow state that forms in its
stead can become very strong.26 In Papua New Guinea, networks for
drug smuggling are well established. Corruption easily becomes en-
trenched; often the only way that the state can function (and members
of the government get paid) is if shadow state networks and contacts are
utilized. In the Solomon Islands, government officials had close contact
with former members of the Malaitan Eagle Force and with current crim-
inal gangs.
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There are also humanitarian and moral dimensions to any calcula-
tion of Australia’s interests. Australia has a historical association with
the peoples of the South Pacific and has traditionally responded to hu-
manitarian crises in the region. As the major power in the South Pacific,
Australia’s behaviour in the region affects the way Australia is viewed
internationally. In the event of dramatic circumstances – for example,
the January 2003 cyclone in the Solomon Islands – there is an expecta-
tion, internationally and in the region, that Australia should assist. As
the Australian government’s 2003 Defence Update acknowledges: ‘‘The
strength of our national interests, and our prominent leadership role in
the region, means that Australia could be called upon to provide assis-
tance to the region in times of crisis, and will need to maintain the capa-
bility to respond effectively.’’27
Finally, Australia has significant commercial and economic interests
in the South Pacific that are damaged by law and order problems, corrup-
tion and weak governance. There are also opportunity costs. Moreover,
the Australian government has the responsibility to protect the thou-
sands of Australians residing, travelling and conducting business in the
South Pacific.
However, Australia had until recently viewed the parlous situation
in much of the South Pacific with a relative lack of interest. Australian
policy towards the South Pacific countries since their independence had
essentially been to provide them with aid but to expect them to solve
their own problems and merely to support them in their own efforts. As
the decline in the region gathered pace in the 1990s, Australian govern-
ments judged that Australia’s interests were not sufficiently engaged by
the problems in the South Pacific to alter their policy approach; for ex-
ample, Australia decided not to intervene in the ethnic conflict and de
facto coup in the Solomon Islands. Indeed, the objective in the region
has been described as being to ‘‘cleverly manage trouble’’.28
This policy paradigm towards the South Pacific was underpinned by
respect for the status of these countries as sovereign states and by a rejec-
tion of colonialism. The Australian government acknowledged in its 2003
Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper: ‘‘Australia cannot presume to
fix the problems of the South Pacific countries. Australia is not a neo-
colonial power. The island countries are independent sovereign states.’’29
The policy approach was also based on the assumption that, when these
countries became independent, they acquired not only juridical sover-
eignty but also the capacity to be viable entities in their own right.30
Three factors have driven a reassessment of this long-standing policy
paradigm. First, there was a growing belief in Australian policy circles
that the security challenges posed by state weakness in the South Pacific
were such that Australia’s level of engagement in the South Pacific
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 137
should be reassessed. Second, there was growing awareness that the ex-
isting policy approach was not working. It was based on the presumption
that the island states could solve their own problems, whereas it was
increasingly recognized that countries such as the Solomon Islands did
not have the capacity adequately to do so. Third, there was a growing
consensus that Australia has a responsibility towards the region and is
uniquely placed as the region’s metropole to assist.
In reality, Australia’s choices were relatively constrained. In theory,
Australia could cease its assistance to the South Pacific, as some econo-
mists had advocated, but in practice this was extremely unlikely.31 Or
Australia could continue its existing policy and keep expecting the coun-
tries of the region to solve their own problems. Or Australia could be-
come more engaged. The cautions put forward by exponents of Austra-
lia’s existing policy paradigm included wariness about raising the spectre of
colonialism. The policy challenge for Australia was then to see whether
there was a way of constructively engaging the countries of the South
Pacific that managed the risks attached to increased engagement.
The Australian-led ‘‘cooperative intervention’’ in the Solomon Islands
of July 2003 was therefore a marked departure from the Australian gov-
ernment’s previous policy towards the South Pacific. It stemmed in part
from a recognition of Australia’s responsibility to the region, but also
from a calculation of the security implications of regional state failure.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated in June 2003 that
‘‘we will not sit back and watch while a country slips inexorably into de-
cay and disorder. I say this not just for altruistic reasons. Already the
region is troubled by business scams, illegal exploitation of natural re-
sources, crimes such as gun running, and the selling of passports and
bank licences to dubious foreign interests.’’32
A greater willingness to intervene on the part of potential interveners
such as Australia, as well as acceptance by recipient states such as the So-
lomon Islands, is likely to lead, over the longer term, to consideration of
other consensual intrusions on sovereignty. Indeed, Australia and Papua
New Guinea have since agreed to an ‘‘Enhanced Cooperation Package’’,
whereby around 300 Australian police and public servants will be de-
ployed to Papua New Guinea to help address governance and law and
order problems.
Pacific Island economies are already integrated with Australia and
New Zealand through trade, migration, aid, remittances and military
security ties. But much more could be done, especially in areas such as
trade and labour mobility.33 This will require more direct engagement
on the part of countries such as Australia and New Zealand in relation
to secondment of staff, reciprocal placements and training, and service
delivery in key areas such as health and education. There are starting to
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be moves in this direction. Ensuring state viability in the South Pacific
will also require closer educational, security and economic integration
with neighbours and regional powers, and a more dynamic approach to
regionalism from organizations such as the Pacific Islands Forum.
However, there are risks associated with Australia’s new policy ap-
proach as well. In particular, there are some concerns in the region about
Australia’s heavy-handedness and its possible motives in seeking greater
engagement in the region. To allay these concerns, the Australian gov-
ernment will need to work to build consensus in the region and proceed
with due regard for regional sensitivities. Otherwise, there is a risk that
worries about Australia’s style could scupper the broad agreement on
greater Australian engagement and closer regional integration.
Lessons
How then should the international community respond to state failure?
From an analysis of the situation in the South Pacific and international
interventions in the region, a number of lessons can be drawn for poten-
tial interventions in weak and failing states.
First, issues of sovereignty arise as part of any international inter-
vention, and ideally any response should have the consent of the state
involved. In the Pacific, this has been less of a problem than in other re-
gions of the world. In fact, there have been complaints from some gov-
ernments (for example, the Solomon Islands) about the lack of forceful
and timely intervention from regional powers such as Australia. Consent
may allay regional fears of less-than-benign intentions behind the inter-
vention. It also helps to ensure that ‘‘intervention’’ is not understood as
merely sending in troops, but focuses on real needs such as the restora-
tion of law and order and restructuring of institutions such as the police.
Second, closer regional cooperation is the key to resurrecting a bad
neighbourhood. Regional problems require regional support and a re-
gional response. Wherever possible, such responses should be multi-
national and draw in interested states from the region and beyond. The
broad support of the rest of the South Pacific for the Australian-led
involvement in the Solomon Islands, for example, has been a critical fea-
ture of the operation. And a multilateral approach helps to deflect accu-
sations of neo-colonialism. Interventions should receive endorsement
from a regional multilateral forum and, ideally, from the United Nations.
Third, the new security environment has created opportunities both for
regional engagement and regional cooperation. Recent regional coopera-
tion on counter-terrorism and other transnational issues provides a good
model, and can be built upon to encourage greater international engage-
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 139
ment with the island countries. Note that intervention for peace monitor-
ing does not necessarily mean armed forces. The various international
truce and peace monitoring missions in Bougainville and the Solomon
Islands succeeded in lowering tensions, in part because of their multi-
national composition but also because they were unarmed. Indeed,
unarmed peace monitors have proven surprisingly good at monitoring
shaky peace deals.
Fourth, some of the most serious security problems facing weak and
failing states are ones of internal or transnational security, which require
a robust policing – as opposed to military – response. Most South Pacific
countries do not have a military force at all. Some countries, however,
such as Vanuatu, make their police force a branch of the military, compli-
cating relations between the forces. As a result, the division of roles be-
comes increasingly unclear. Comparative experience suggests that many
crisis situations are better suited to a primarily police response than a pri-
marily military intervention.
For example, although the Australian-led deployment to the Solomon
Islands initially involved a significant military component to protect
the police and to remove illegal weapons, the restoration of security in
the Solomon Islands is first and foremost a policing operation. More re-
sources need to be put into building capacity for police responses of this
nature. Assistance could involve not only building up indigenous police
capacity, but also creating a regional police response capability when cri-
ses arise.
Finally, state-building is a long-term process. Supporting weak and
failing states requires a sustained and often open-ended commitment.
Constructive engagement must directly address weak institution and gov-
ernance issues and chronic economic and social problems. Efforts should
include the creation of robust rule of law (police, corrections and judi-
ciary) and the strengthening of institutions and governance. There should
also be increasing moves to deal more directly with grassroots groups and
with strong local institutions such as the churches.
For Australia’s part, this means an ongoing and increasing commit-
ment to the South Pacific: as one commentator has noted, it makes little
sense to devise an exit strategy from your own immediate neighbour-
hood.34
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